The second criterion calls for quantifiable measurability. In principle, one can enumerate the complete list of bad things that happen to a system by malicious action. One can use hazard analysis techniques and attack trees to create such enumerations. Getting a complete list is hard, but it is doable at some level of abstraction.
Next, using the more formal definition of risk, one must find the probability of all the enumerated events and the consequences of such an event to mission effectiveness. Within mature disciplines such data can come from statistics on a long history of empirical events. Such are the techniques used by insurance companies. Unfortunately, the realm of information security has a very short history with little good objective data sets collected on attacks and with few (if any) rare catastrophic events yielding widespread critical damage (though some might say that some worms of the recent past did serious damage).
In principle, as more data is collected, probabilities can be established through empirical data. Until then, subject matter expert opinion based on difficulty, cost, and other such factors related to the bad event, can be used as an approximation. For events that end up having a profound effect on the final calculation of system risk, one can perform experimentation to try to form a better basis for those probabilities. The consequence part of the equation can be established through failure analysis linked back to mission effectiveness. It is most straight-forward to do such an analysis if mission can be reduced to cost, but other measures can be established for more challenging missions such as national defense. So, we see that measurability is at least possible in principle, that it is practical today to some degree of accuracy, and that there is a path by which that accuracy can be improved.
The criteria of accuracy and validation are closely tied together. Without ground truth, neither can be established. This appears to be the most difficult criteria for security metrics. The ground truth of probabilities and consequences is hard to establish without a long history of empirical data, and even there it is hard to establish for rare events. To-day, best effort is expert opinion back by rationale, including experimentation, modeling and other evidence that can be mustered to back the opinion. Eventually, such approximations can be replaced by the growing body of empirical data. So, even though validation today is problematic, it is possible to approximate validation and it will eventually be possible to do it with increasing accuracy.
How this relates to trustworthiness? A system is trustworthy if it is worthy of reliance on the character, integrity and ability of system to meet its goals. Without a metric to gauge progress toward its goal, it is likely to continue to be difficult to make efficient progress toward trustworthiness as a system property.
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